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THE NAME GAME: CYBERSQUATTING AND
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ON SOCIAL
MEDIA WEBSITES
Thomas J. Curtin
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, Internet use has grown astronomically,1
allowing Internet users to have increased control over web page
creation, and permitting Internet users to create unique profiles for
social networking.2 With such growth and evolution, the Internet
has also become a dangerous venue where individuals hijack
domain names and profit off the damage caused to a brand name.
For example, were an Internet user to accidentally type
“Citybank.org,” instead of “Citibank.org,” into his browser to
perform online banking activities, he would stumble upon a
website with misleading Citibank advertisements that would
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A., Fordham University, 2008.
I would like to thank my friends and family for their support during the writing
process. I would also like to thank Professor Bambauer for his guidance on this
topic.
1
See Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last updated July 30, 2010)
(showing that in 1995, only 16 million users browsed the Internet, while in
2010, that number skyrocketed to 1.65 billion users).
2
See Maria Markella, The Web 2.0 Phenomenon: Another Trend?,
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/web-20-phenomenon-anotherBUZZLE.COM,
internet-trend.html (noting that the movement is characterized by websites, such
as Myspace, which allow “users to take active part in the development of a
webpage’s content and history . . . .”); see also Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0,
O’REILLY MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/whatis-web-20.html?page=1 (discussing how the burst of the dot com bubble in the
earlier part of the decade gave rise to a phenomenon known as Web 2.0, which
makes software much more accessible to browsers).
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redirect him to competitors’ websites.3 The resulting frustration in
being redirected to the wrong website would be directed in part
toward Citibank and its goodwill.4 Such diversions, as in the
Citigroup example, are not accidents; rather, they are scams
intended to bring Internet users to competitors’ sites so that the
domain name owners make a profit off of the Internet user’s
mistake.
This process, known as cybersquatting, is a form of trademark
infringement.5 Cybersquatting involves the bad faith registration
of “well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to
force the rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to
engage in electronic commerce under [their own trademark].”6
Cybersquatters hurry to a domain registration site to register a
domain name similar to another company’s trademark before that
company has had the chance to protect and fully use its trademark.7
To cite one example, an impostor registered the domain name
“attphonecard.com” and established a website that solicited credit
card information from Internet users.8 In this case, the Internet user
wonders why he stumbled on an unrelated website, which he did
not intend to visit, and which then fraudulently obtained his
financial information. The abusive registration of this domain
name harmed the AT&T brand and the consumer’s frustration
resulting from this scam likely was directed at AT&T and its
mark.9 Such abusive registration of domain names confuses the
consumer and allows the infringer to profit off of his misconduct.10
3

Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (E.D. Va.

2009).
4

See id. Indeed, the court in Citigroup noted that the defendant reserved
this domain name solely to garner click through revenue. Id.
5
See Virtual Works Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267
(4th Cir. 2001) (describing how cybersquatting is the “Internet version of a land
grab”).
6
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999)).
7
Id. at 267.
8
Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. REP. NO.
106-140, 106th Cong. 8 (1999) (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int’l
Trademark Ass’n).
9
See id.
10
Hamptons Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, 640 F. Supp. 2d 208, 218
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Trademark infringement on the Internet is not merely confined
to squatting on a domain name; courts have also held that
trademark infringement includes abusively reserving “metatags”11
similar to famous brands on search engines such as Google.12 In
this form of infringement, the impostor13 uses famous brand names
as hidden text in the website, which, in turn, creates search words
on search engines to lead the consumer to an impostor website.14
These metatags are a form of infringement because, if used in an
abusive manner, they act as a mechanism to traffic Internet users to
an impostor website.15
On June 13, 2009, Facebook,16 a social media site boasting 500
million active members,17 unveiled a new username feature that
allowed its users to create distinct web addresses, or “vanity

(E.D.N.Y. 2009).
11
“Metatags are HTML code intended to describe the contents of the web
site . . . . The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the
web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be “hit” in a search for that
keyword and the higher on the list of “hits” the web page will appear.”
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1999).
12
See Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir.
2002) (“Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s webpage [as a result of the
infringing metatag] are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products before
beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak.”); see generally THOMAS

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:69
(4th ed. 2010) (describing how the Lanham Act applies to metatags).
13
For the purposes of this Note, “impostor” will refer generally to
cybersquatters.
14
See, e.g., Aztar Corp. v. MGM Casino, No. 00-833-A, 2001 WL 939070,
at *5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (describing how defendant used Tropicana as a metatag to
traffic browsers to his infringing website, “tropicanacasino.com”).
15
Id.; Kraft Food Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (noting how defendant used “VelVeeda” as a metatag to direct
browsers to a pornographic website entitled “cheesygraphics.com”).
16
Facebook is the most popular social media website, and allows
individuals to create profiles, add friends, and join networks organized by
school, workplace, or location. Josie Myers, What is Facebook?, WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
17
Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited Sept. 13, 2010).

356

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

URLs,”18 for their profiles.19 On the one hand, the feature is
beneficial in that it allows users to express themselves and makes it
easier for other users to connect with them.20 In addition, the
vanity URL cuts search costs by allowing individuals to use their
names and allowing companies to use their brands as usernames.21
On the other hand, the feature also makes it easier to hijack a
trademark by allowing impostors to reserve a brand name as their
usernames.
Before Facebook launched its username feature, users on other
social media sites, such as Twitter22 and Myspace,23 abused the
username feature and reserved others’ names to pose as celebrities;
users also created impostor profiles that maligned the celebrities’
character.24 For example, on Twitter, impostors posed as well18

The username functions as a “vanity URL” because the reservation of the
username changes the URL from a numerical identification number to the
individual’s or corporation’s name. See Peter T. Wakiyama & Odia Kagan,
Facebook Vanity URLs May Hurt More Than Just One’s Pride, 21 NO. 9.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 7 (2009) (“On June 13, 2009, Facebook vanity
URLs
opened
for
registration
by
its
users.
Instead
of
www.facebook.com/id=591932074, a user’s page would now be located at
www.facebook.com/johndoe, allowing the user to be easily found by entering his
or her name into the URL in the browser.”).
19
See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon: Facebook Usernames, THE
FACEBOOK BLOG (June 9, 2009, 12:11PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?
post=90316352130 (highlighting the usefulness of the Facebook username
feature).
20
Id.
21
See id.
22
Twitter is a social media website that enables users to post thoughts and
messages as “tweets,” and allows individuals to follow others’ tweets. About
Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
Additionally, the website allows individuals to group tweets together using
“hashtags,” which appears in search engine results, including on Twitter’s home
page. TECH FOR LUDDITES (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.techforluddites.com/
2009/02/the-twitter-hash-tag-what-is-it-and-how-do-you-use-it.html.
23
MySpace enables individuals to create unique profiles, add friends, and
send messages, thereby empowering “its global community to experience the
Internet through a social lens by integrating personal profiles, photos, videos,
mobile, messaging, games, and the world’s largest music community.” MySpace
Press Room, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/pressroom (last visited Sept.
13, 2010).
24
See Douglas MacMillan, LaRussa v. Twitter Tests Web Anonymity,
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known figures such as the Dalai Lama and Kanye West.25 Needless
to say, celebrities were not pleased with these impersonations.26 In
one recent illustration of this problem, an anonymous user created
an impostor account for BP, titled “BPGlobalPR,” mocking the
company for its handling of the oil spill.27 The mock account was
followed by almost 145,000 people, and the fake profile garnered
significant media attention.28 In response to BP’s complaints about
the mock account, Twitter coerced the operator of the profile to
post a disclaimer.29 However, a response like Twitter’s may only
go so far; as the population of social media sites has grown
exponentially, efforts to control this problem and enforce
trademark policies have been increasingly futile.
On June 5, 2009, Tony La Russa, the manager of the St. Louis
Cardinals, filed a complaint against Twitter, accusing Twitter of
cybersquatting.30 The dispute centered on a Twitter profile that
used La Russa’s name, had a picture of La Russa, and had a
headline that said “Hey there! Tony La Russa is now using

BUSINESSWEEK (June 10, 2009, 12:01 AM EST), http://www.businessweek.com
/technology/content/jun2009/tc2009069_767898.htm.
25
Id.
26
Id. See also Big Tent Democrat, Obama, URLs, Domain Names,
Cybersquatting and The First Amendment, TALKLEFT.COM (May 2, 2007, 3:20
PM), http://www.talkleft.com/story/2007/5/2/161947/9512 (noting that President
Obama complained about an unofficial MySpace profile entitled “Friends of
Obama,” which MySpace later transferred to his campaign).
27
Brian Stelter, BP Account on Twitter? Just a Joke; K thx bye, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us/10twitter.html.
See also Maria Newman, BlogTalk: Twitter and the G.O.P., THE CAUCUS (Oct.
22, 2009, 2:49 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/blogtalktwitter-and-the-gop/ (discussing how Republican operatives created fake profiles
with names like “MeetRepDonovan” and “MeetRepUrban”). Twitter shut down
the account because the impersonation was intended to deceive voters and it
confused voters, despite the disclaimer that the profile was sponsored by the
state’s Republican Party. Id.
28
Stelter, supra note 27.
29
Id.. Twitter’s policy allows users to pose as celebrities as long as they
disclaim that the page is merely an impersonation and not intended to deceive
anyone. See id.
30
See Complaint at 2, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, 2009
WL 1569936 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint, La Russa].
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Twitter.”31 The profile encouraged users to “[j]oin today to start
receiving Tony La Russa’s updates.”32 Unfortunately for the users
who followed these tweets, the status updates were vulgar and
derogatory.33 La Russa argued that the author of the profile
intended, in bad faith, to divert Internet traffic away from La
Russa’s website and make a profit from the injury to La Russa’s
mark.34 La Russa’s case is the first of its kind, as no one has
previously sued a social network site for cybersquatting.35
La Russa v. Twitter, Inc. brings to the fore the issue of users
reserving usernames and abusively using “hashtags”36 that infringe
upon famous brands. This Note argues that the username features
on social networking sites have opened the door for a new form of
cybersquatting and trademark infringement, one which extends
beyond the infringement of personal names.37 The vanity URLs
and hashtags afford impostors with the opportunity to reserve
famous brands as usernames and allow the impostor to use brands
in hashtags to deceptively lure unsuspecting Internet users to an
31

Mark Milian, Cardinals Manager Tony La Russa Sues Twitter for
Imposter Account, L.A. TIMES BLOG (June 4, 2009, 12:27 PM), http://latimes
blogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/06/tony-la-russa-twitter.html.
32
Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 3.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 4.
35
See Macmillan, supra note 24. However, La Russa v. Twitter is not the
first social media cybersquatting case; rather, the first case was Thompson v.
Clean Flicks Media, in which a company sued an individual for reserving a
MySpace username in bad faith. See Steven Seidenberg, Name’s Sake: Social
Media Pose Trademark Threats for Companies, INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/September-2009/Pages/
Names-Sake.aspx.
36
A hashtag is a form of metatag, typically preceded by the “#” symbol,
which allows users to categorize their tweets. What are Hashtags?, TWITTER
HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/entries/49309-what-are-hashtagssymbols (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). By categorizing their tweets, the hashtags
allow tweets to show up in search engines. See id.
37
Unlike other recent scholarly articles, the focus of this Note will be
solely on username infringement of famous trademarks and brand names. See,
e.g., Zorik Pesochinsky, Almost Famous: Preventing Username Squatting on
Social Networking Websites, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 223, 224–25
(2010) (discussing the implications of username infringement on personal
names).
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infringing profile. Such abusive registrations allow the impostor to
make a profit off of the injury of a trademark and damage the
reputation of a famous brand name.
However, the enforcement of trademark rights on social media
websites could have a chilling effect on free speech rights and
expose social media websites to frivolous lawsuits. Thus,
enforcement must be limited. This Note maintains that both
Twitter and Facebook need to expand their policies to include
username infringement and hashtag infringement, and that
Congress needs to amend the scope of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) to address many of the
complex issues associated with trademark infringement on social
media websites.
Part I of this Note will discuss the concept of cybersquatting
and examine the ACPA.38 Part II of this Note will explore the
username features on Facebook and Twitter, illustrate the potential
hazards that these features pose to the proprietary interests of
trademark owners, and discuss whether the ACPA is applicable in
the social networking arena. Part III will analyze the consequences
of enforcing trademark rights on social media websites,
specifically addressing free speech interests and contributory
infringement. Finally, Part IV will propose legislative solutions to
the problems associated with cybersquatting on social media
websites.
I. THE CONCEPT OF CYBERSQUATTING AND ITS STATUTORY
REMEDY
The pervasiveness of the Internet in everyday transactions has

38

This Note will discuss the implications of the ACPA in the social
networking arena, rather than focusing on the Uniform Domain Resolution
Policy adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, UNIFORM DOMAIN
RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), available at http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrppolicy-24oct99.htms. Since the Uniform Domain Resolution Policy only focuses
on second-level domain name infringement, and is not nearly as potent of a
remedy as the ACPA (because its effects can merely be avoided by suing in
federal court), it is not as relevant in this venue. See Seindenberg, supra note 35.
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inevitably led to infringement of intellectual property.39 The
amount of Internet transactions has increased dramatically over the
past decade, and companies have taken advantage of this venue by
advertising and selling their products on the Internet.40 With so
many people browsing the Internet every day, it has become
profitable for impostors to divert Internet users from their intended
destinations thus diverting some of the business those users
generate. These impostors rushed to register domain names that
were remarkably similar to trademarks of corporations and, in
doing so, left trademark owners powerless to protect their marks
and register related domain names.41 In response to this practice,
Congress took steps to give trademark owners protection rights on
the Internet by enacting the ACPA in 1999.42 The statute gives
trademark owners the power to seize domain names that are
confusingly similar to their marks.43
A. The Concept of Cybersquatting
There are many economic incentives for actors to engage in
cybersquatting, but this practice often comes at the expense of
trademark owners. The cybersquatter is typically able to divert the
Internet user to the websites of a company’s competitors.44 These
competitors pay the cybersquatter for each hit that they get on their
websites.45 In addition, because the trademark owner is unable to
take advantage of his brand name, he is essentially forced to pay
for the right to use his own brand name on the Internet46 because
the cybersquatter typically charges a fee to the trademark owner to
39

See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999).
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d
Cir. 2000)
41
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6–7.
42
See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §25:78.
43
See id.
44
Id. §25:77.
45
See Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 765 (N.D.
Ill. 2008).
46
See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C., 202 F.3d at 493 (noting that mark owners are
often “willing to pay ‘ransom’ in order to get ‘their names’ back”) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7; S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–7 (1999)).
40

The Name Game

361

transfer the domain name.47
The process by which a cybersquatter harms the proprietary
interests of trademark owners is important to understand.48 The
registration of a domain name similar to a brand name prevents the
trademark owner from using his brand name in e-commerce
because registration is done on a first come, first served basis.49 By
registering a domain name that is substantially similar to the
owner’s trademark, the cybersquatter precludes that owner from
being able to use his brand name, which he likely spent a
considerable amount of time building.50 Thus, the trademark owner
is unable to fully take advantage of his own brand name, which
may result in a loss of potential profits.51 In addition, the
registration of a website and reservation of relevant search terms
prevent a trademark owner from having full control over his brand
name and its reputation.52 By diverting the Internet user away from
his intended destination, the Internet user can become confused
and unsure of whether the website is legitimate.53 Finally, the use
of a mark in a domain name could essentially make a term generic,
which would leave the term without any protection.54
B. The Statutory Remedy to Cybersquatting
With the proliferation of Internet transactions in the 1990s and
into the twenty-first century, cybersquatting became a widespread
practice and trademark owners were left without a remedy to such
47

See id. (“Cybersquatting involves the registration [of] domain names . . .
by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the trademark
owners.”).
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 7.
51
See id. at 6.
52
See id.
53
Id.
54
See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine
Advertising Market: Lucrative Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 223, 244–45 (2009) (“It is this same ability to convey meaning that
underlies the great irony of trademark law—that too much success can bring
ruin through genericide.”).
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trademark infringement.55 In response to this problem, Congress
passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999.56
The ACPA served as an extension of the Lanham Act to protect
trademark owners from infringement on the Internet by providing a
trademark infringement cause of action for cases of cybersquatting.
The statute applies only to top level domain names.57 This new
cause of action gives trademark owners an alternative to paying
fees to cybersquatters to transfer domain names to the rightful
owner and gives trademark owners the ability to enforce their
rights on the Internet.58
Under an ordinary trademark infringement claim, a trademark
must be sufficiently distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness.59
The ACPA incorporated the distinctiveness requirement of
trademark law,60 but added some additional requirements. In order
to succeed on a cybersquatting claim, the plaintiff must
55

MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:77.
Id. § 25:78.
57
See Hamptons Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, 640 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213
(E.D.N.Y 2009) (quoting Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)) (“[ACPA] ‘was passed to protect consumers and
American businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide
clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive
registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to
profit from the goodwill associated with such marks . . . .’”). ACPA defines a
“domain name” as “any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or
assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.”
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2006).
As discussed later in this section, this could prove to be problematic for features
such as hashtags. See infra Part IV.A.
58
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
59
A trademark that is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive is inherently
distinctive. See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1974). A descriptive term could be afforded the same protection
as inherently distinctive marks if it obtains secondary meaning, in which the
word is known by the public as specifically designating a particular product.
See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smoke House, 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting that the term “FISH FRI” did obtain secondary meaning).
60
See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Venetiangold.com, 380 F.
Supp. 2d 737, 741–42 (E.D. Va. 2005) (discussing the ACPA’s requirement for
distinctiveness of a mark).
56
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demonstrate that the defendant registered or trafficked in a domain
name that is (1) confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark and (2) that
the defendant “had a bad faith intent to profit from the mark.”61
The plaintiff’s mark must be distinctive at the time of the
registration of the domain name.62 Upon satisfying both criteria,
the plaintiff is entitled to an in rem action consisting of the
cancellation or transfer of the domain name to the rightful owner.63
1. The Likelihood of Confusion
In order to state a successful cybersquatting claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the infringing domain name is confusingly
similar to or dilutive of the plaintiff’s mark.64 In cybersquatting
cases, confusingly similar means that the plaintiff’s mark and the
defendant’s domain name are so similar “in sight, sound or
meaning that they could be confused.”65 Courts analyze the
likelihood of confusion in Internet cases using a two-step analysis;
they consider (1) whether the marks are substantially similar and
(2) the proximity of the goods and services.66 The test, however,
could end with the first step if the marks are identical or nearly
identical.67
61

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1125(d)(1)(A) (West 2006).
62
Id. §1125(d)(2)(A).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. Courts do not solely consider the
similarity between domain names; rather courts also consider the similarity
between the domain name and the plaintiff’s trademark. Id.
66
See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir.
2000). In GoTo.com, the court stated that in the Internet context, a likelihood of
confusion analysis should entail an examination of (1) the similarity of the
marks, (2) the proximity of the goods and services, and (3) the simultaneous use
of the Web as a marketing channel. Id. This test is simpler than the seven factor
tests employed in “standard” likelihood of confusion cases. See, e.g., Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 1961). In GoTo.com,
the court’s third factor is rather redundant because, as the court admits, the two
marks will likely be seen on the same screen. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1207.
Therefore, this Note will not address the third factor.
67
See, e.g., Texas Int’l. Prop. Assoc. v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, 624 F.
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Courts generally treat domain names that are substantially
similar to a trademark as confusingly similar and thereby create a
presumption of confusion.68 A similarity in the appearance or
sound of a mark could confuse consumers and this is relevant to
the likelihood of confusion analysis.69 For example, in Texas
International Property Associates v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, the
court held that the Texas International Property Association’s
“horbiger.com” was confusingly similar to Hoerbiger’s mark
because the domain name had nearly identical spelling to the
Hoerbiger mark.70 Likewise, in People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, the court maintained that defendant’s
domain name, “PETA.org,” was a direct copy of plaintiff’s mark
and thus created a presumption of confusion on the part of Internet
user.71 In both cases, the courts held that a substantial similarity
between a domain name and a trademark creates the presumption
of confusion and would eliminate the need to analyze the
proximity of the goods and services.72
Courts sometimes focus on the proximity between the goods
and services that the domain name offers and those the
trademarked company offers in order to ascertain whether Internet
users are likely to be confused.73 However, the proximity of the
Supp. 2d 582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
68
See id.
69
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
70
See Texas Int’l, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
71
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d
915, 919–20 (E.D. Va. 2000). Interestingly, the acronym used in the website was
different from the plaintiff’s mark (it stood for People Eating Tasty Animals),
but the court held that this difference was immaterial. Id. at 918.
72
See Texas Int’l., 624 F. Supp. 2d at 588; Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at
920.
73
Compare Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497,
504 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the luncheon meat SPAM and the Muppets
character Spa’am were dissimilar), with GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
202 F.3d 1199, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that “GoTo” and “Go
Network” were similar where both entities operated web search engines). See
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattell, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In the
context of two subjectively dissimilar marks, evidence of actual confusion and
evidence defining the context in which the goods are sold are particularly
relevant.”).
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goods and services of a website arguably has nothing to do with
the brand name in question.74 For example, in Cintas Corp. v.
Unite Here, the plaintiff was unable to prove that the disputed
website, “cintasexposed.com” was confusingly similar to the
CINTAS mark since there was “no proximity between the parties’
goods and services.”75 The defendant’s website did not function as
a source identifier; instead, the website served to “criticize Cintas’
corporate practices.”76 Therefore, this second factor can either
demonstrate consumer confusion, or it can establish that the
website does not confuse consumers.
2. The Bad Faith Intent Requirement
In addition to the ACPA’s requirement for a likelihood of
confusion, the plaintiff must also establish that the defendant
intended, in bad faith, to profit from the plaintiff’s trademark by
registering the domain name.77 Congress designed the ACPA to
“combat deliberate, bad faith, and abusive” registration of a
domain name.78 The ACPA includes a list of nine non-exclusive
factors that allow the court to infer bad faith intent on the part of
the impostor.79 Under the safe harbor provision, if the court finds
74

MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 25:78. McCarthy argues that this second
factor is irrelevant for cybersquatting because many of these websites will not
even be set up. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999) (“These
cyberpirates have no intention of using the domain name in commerce and
instead often attempt to exact money from a company in exchange for domain
names that relate to that company’s trademarks.”).
75
Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
76
See id.
77
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (West 2006).
78
Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (citing
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 624, 627 (4th Cir.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). These bad faith factors include:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name
consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person’s prior use, if
any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of

366

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the
domain name was available for fair use, then the defendant does
not have the bad faith intent required by the ACPA.80
Although courts will typically examine all of the ACPA
elements for bad faith intent and determine if the elements favor
either party, each element is not exclusive.81 When most of the
elements cut in favor of the trademark owner, the court will infer
bad faith intent.82 For example, in Citigroup v. Chen Bao Shui, the
court held that defendant Chen Bao Shui’s registration of the
any goods or services; (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the
person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with
the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
the site; (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the
bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person’s
provision of material and misleading false contact information when
applying for the registration of the domain name, the person’s
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VIII) the
person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or
dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark
incorporated in the person’s domain name registration is or is not
distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) of this
section.
Id.
80

Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. See, e.g., Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that since a majority of the elements favored Fornario, he had a
“colorable defense” to the cybersquatting claim); Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469
F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (maintaining that the majority of the elements cut
against the defendant, thereby satisfying the bad faith intent requirement).
82
Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 549.
81
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website “citybank.org” did not create intellectual property rights in
the domain name.83 Prior to the registration of the website, Chen
Bao Shui did not use the domain name to offer any goods or
services.84 In addition, the court maintained that Chen Bao Shui
intended to “confuse, mislead, and divert Internet traffic to garner
click-through revenue” through false Citibank advertisements.85
Finally, the court noted that Chen Bao Shui registered multiple
domain names identical to Citibank’s marks.86 When considering
the ACPA’s bad faith factors, the court easily held that Chen Bao
Shui acted in bad faith.87
C. Trademark Infringement with Metatags
Trademark infringement on the Internet is not limited to
cybersquatting and such infringement includes the abusive use of
metatags.88 However, the ACPA does not apply to metatags.89
Indeed, the language of the ACPA provides an action only against
an individual who “registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name.”90
The ACPA defines a “domain name” as “any alphanumeric
designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name
registration authority as part of an electronic address on the
Internet.”91 A metatag does not meet this definition because it is
not assigned by a domain name registrar, but instead is entirely

83

Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (E.D. Va.

2009).
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id. at 510–12 (noting that defendant registered multiple domain names
similar to Citigroup’s registered marks: “Citibank,” “Citifield,” and
“Citifinancial”).
87
Id. at 512.
88
See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:69.
89
See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
90
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1125(d)(A)(1)(ii) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
91
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West
2006).
85
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controlled by the web page creator.92
Even though metatags fall outside of the scope of the ACPA,
infringing use of such devices is still actionable under the Lanham
Act.93 The rationale for such protection is that the abusive use of
metatags creates an initial interest problem: the consumer, who is
deceptively lured to a competitor’s website might choose to
conduct business there rather than search for his intended
destination.94 Unlike with the ACPA, courts engage in the
traditional lengthy likelihood of confusion analysis for metatag
infringement, which typically consists of eight factors.95 Passing
this lengthy test is not easy,96 but trademark owners nevertheless
have recourse for metatag infringement.97
92

See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:69.
See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762
(E.D. Mich. 2003). However, some courts, such as the Second Circuit, do not
entirely recognize metatag infringement as a trademark cause of action. See 1800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (holding that
“internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the
public” does not constitute “use” and thus does not violate the Lanham Act).
94
See Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir.
2002) (“Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s webpage [as a result of the
infringing metatag] are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products
before beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak.”); Brookfield
Commc’ns Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp, 174 F.3d, 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with
another’s trademark in front of one’s store.”).
95
See N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis, 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)). The Polaroid factors for likelihood of
confusion include:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity
between the two marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products
or services; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap”
between the two markets; (5) the existence of actual confusion; (6) the
defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the
defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the purchasers.
Id.
96
See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 199 F. Supp. 2d, 309, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that the abusive use of metatags did not create a likelihood of
confusion).
97
See Promatek Indus. Ltd., 300 F.3d at 812 (holding a likelihood of
confusion was probable after applying a seven factor likelihood of confusion
93
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II. CYBERSQUATTING AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN THE
SOCIAL MEDIA ARENA
In light of the popularity of social media websites, corporations
have created profiles on these websites to gain more customers.98
Website administrators have extended the username feature to
corporations who wish to use the feature to build a strong
reputation for their marks.99 Although Tony La Russa dropped his
suit against Twitter, his case highlighted the hazards of the new
username features on these websites.100 The ACPA is applicable in
the social networking venue, but prospective plaintiffs might have
difficulty proving that defendant acted with the bad faith intent
required by the ACPA.101
A. The Hazards of Name Squatting and Hashtag Infringement
1. Name Squatting: Why it Matters
The reservation of usernames and the abusive use of tags are
particularly harmful to trademark owners. Facebook admits that
username infringement can “be a big deal[,] especially if someone
else is looking to build a reputation using a brand name that you’ve
spent a long time building.”102 Cybersquatting via username
infringement prevents the trademark owner from using that
recognizable username, and thereby inhibits his ability to use his
brand name on that particular social media website.103 Reserving a
username, much like reserving a domain name, allows the
test); N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 340–42
(holding that the infringing use of metatags passed the Polaroid test).
98
See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in
Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2009) [hereinafter,
McGeveran, Disclosure].
99
See id.
100
See MacMillan, supra note 24.
101
See infra Part II.C.
102
Nick O’Neill, How to Get Your Facebook Username Back From a
Squatter, ALLFACEBOOK (June 22, 2009, 10:04 AM), http://www.allfacebook.
com/2009/06/facebook-username-squatter/.
103
See id.
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impostor to prevent the trademark owner from using his brand
name in a useful market.104
Moreover, the reservation of a username by an impostor can
tarnish and dilute the reputation of the mark. When someone
reserves a username in bad faith, the trademark owner loses control
over the reputation of his brand name. For example, in Clean
Flicks, Inc. v. Daniel Dean Thompson, the defendant’s
cybersquatting tainted the Clean Flicks mark.105 Specifically, the
defendant registered Clean Flicks Media as his username on
Myspace and tried to pass himself off as one of the founders of the
company.106 The problem with this reservation was that the
defendant was arrested for possession of child pornography,
statutory rape, and other crimes which were completely at odds
with Clean Flicks’ reputation as a family entertainment business.107
In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, news stories linked Clean
Flicks Media to the defendant because of the Myspace page,108 and
Clean Flicks had to sue in order to defend its reputation.109
Therefore, reserving usernames leaves trademark owners without
control over the reputation of their marks, which could be
detrimental to the mark’s power.

104

See Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=897
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that users must choose a “unique”
username). See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125,
1126–27 (D. Colo. 2000) (discussing how registering a domain name precludes
trademark owners from using their brand names). See generally McGeveran,
Disclosure, supra note 98 (discussing the value of social media as a medium for
marketing).
105
See Complaint at 6, Clean Flicks, Inc. v. Daniel Dean Thompson, No.
2:08-cv-0086-PMW (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2008) available at http://www.schwimmer
legal.com/Complaint%20clean%20flicks.pdf [hereinafter Complaint, Clean
Flicks]. See also Nate Anderson, Sex, Drugs, and Dirty Movies: CleanFlicks
Sues Doppelganger, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2008/02/sex-drugs-and-dirty-movies-cleanflicks-sues
cyberpirate.ars.
106
Id.
107
Complaint, Clean Flicks, supra note 105, at 4; Anderson, supra note
105.
108
Complaint, Clean Flicks, supra note 105, at 4.
109
See Anderson, supra note 105.
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2. The Dangers of Hashtag Infringement
Much like name squatting, hashtag infringement is a significant
problem on Twitter. Hashtags, much like metatags, allow
individuals to place words in their profiles and on tweets, which in
turn show up on search engines.110 By allowing individuals free
control over the content of their tags in tweets, individuals have
abused this feature and in turn, inflicted harm on the power and
distinctiveness of a brand name.
Taco John’s is one of the more recent victims of infringing use
of hashtags. In August 2010, Taco John’s sent a cease and desist
letter to Iguana Grill for their usage of the hashtag “#tacotuesday,”
which they maintained was an infringing use of their registered
trademark “Taco Tuesday.”111 However, sending this letter
backfired on Taco John’s as the story garnered media attention;
individuals began to use the hashtag freely in their tweets and due
to the media attention, Iguana sold a record number of tacos in one
day.112
The Taco John’s example demonstrates the dangers of an
infringing use of a hashtag. Although hashtag use does not
preclude the trademark owner from using the mark,113 the free use
of a brand name in a hashtag can dilute the trademark or possibly
even lead to genericide.114 The more freely a brand, such as “Taco
Tuesday,” is used, the less likely consumers will recognize the
term as a source identifier.115 When a term loses its function as a
source identifier, the trademark becomes generic and loses its
distinctiveness.116 Without distinctiveness, a trademark is not
entitled to protection.117
110

What are Hashtags?, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/
entries/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
111
See Emily E. Campbell, Taco John’s Claims Rights in Taco Tuesday,
PHOSITA: AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010), http://dunlap
codding.com/phosita/2010/08/taco-johns-claims-rights-in-taco-tuesday.html.
112
See id.
113
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §25:69.
114
See id.
115
See Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 54, at 244–45.
116
See id.
117
See id.
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B. Efforts to Curtail Username Infringement
1. Facebook’s Policy

In an effort to learn from and avoid the pitfalls of Twitter’s and
Myspace’s lax guidelines with username features, Facebook
implemented safeguards to protect trademark owners on its
website.118 Facebook reserves the right to reclaim usernames on
the website if they infringe on a trademark.119 Trademark owners
are responsible for reporting any trademark infringement on a
username infringement form Facebook provides.120 On the form,
trademark owners are expected to provide proof of registration and
explain how the username infringes on their mark.121 If the
trademark owner successfully establishes infringement, then
Facebook will transfer the username to the trademark owner.122
Facebook also encouraged trademark owners to reserve
usernames before the launch of the feature on June 13, 2009.123 To
reserve a username before June 13, users had to have at least one
thousand followers, which is a difficult task for a cybersquatter to
achieve.124 New users were otherwise not permitted to register
until June 28, 2009 to prevent people from creating multiple

118

See Macmillan, supra note 24.
See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon: Facebook Usernames, THE
FACEBOOK BLOG (June 9, 2009, 12:11PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.
php?post=90316352130; see also Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.face
book.com/help/?page=897 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that
Facebook will reclaim any username that it determines to be squatting).
120
See Report an Infringing Username, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/help/contact.php?show_form=username_infringement (last visited Sept. 25,
2010).
121
See id.
122
See id.
123
Facebook Pages, Facebook Usernames Coming Soon for Pages,
FACEBOOK (June 9, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?
post=90316352130.
124
See generally “New Facebook Policy Could Invite Cybersquatting,”
INDIANAPOLIS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jun. 22, 2009 (discussing how many
experts agree that the risk of classic cybersquatting is rather minimal in this
venue).
119
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accounts to reserve usernames in bulk.125 In addition, when the
username feature launched in 2009, Facebook allowed certain
users, namely corporations, to flag certain names that might
conflict with the owner’s trademark.126
Facebook has a verification feature to prevent any future harm
to brand names.127 In an attempt to avoid “name squatting,”
Facebook announced that usernames may now require “mobile
phone authentication.”128 Thus, in order to obtain a username, the
individual might need to verify the account by phone. It remains to
be seen whether Facebook will stringently enforce such
verification. It is also not clear what other loopholes may appear in
this approach; for example, whether the cybersquatter could still
pose as the trademark owner if Facebook were to contact him.
2. Twitter’s Policy
Twitter has also created a verification feature to prevent
confusion.129 Twitter maintains that it created the feature to
“establish authenticity for accounts who deal with identity
confusion regularly on Twitter.”130 Unlike Facebook, Twitter uses
“verification badges” which signal to users that the profile is not
fake.131 Interestingly, Twitter’s mechanism does not yet apply to
all businesses, as the website is currently testing a verification
feature for businesses.132 Currently, the feature is available only to
“public officials, public agencies, famous artists, athletes, and
other well known individuals at risk of impersonation.”133 Some
125

See id.
Facebook Pages, supra note 123.
127
See Macmillan, supra note 24.
128
Help Center, FACEBOOK, supra note 104.
129
See About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/
groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111features/articles/119135-about-verifiedaccounts (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Business Verification, TWITTER, http://twitter.zendesk.com/76487-can-iverify-my-business-account (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
133
Emma Barnett, Twitter Launches Verification Service to Protect
Celebrities, TELEGRAPH (June 8, 2009, 11:04 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.
126
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corporations have access to the verification feature during the
testing period, but at this point, many are not able to benefit from
this feature.134
A search of Twitter reveals that corporations are susceptible to
username infringement, especially those owning famous brand
names.135 When Twitter first created its username feature,
cybersquatters scrambled to reserve usernames that were
substantially similar or identical to famous brand names.136 In
2009, impostors reserved usernames such as Volkswagen,137 which
Twitter has since transferred to the rightful owners.138 One of the
more notable examples was “@Hyundai,” a profile that contained
pictures of scantily clad woman and telling users to “have a lustful
day.”139 After Hyundai threatened to sue Twitter over the
profile,140 the site’s administrators transferred the username to the
co.uk/technology/twitter/5475445/Twitter-launches-verification-service-toprotect-celebrities.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
See Business Verification, TWITTER, supra note 132. For example,
Target has a verified business account. See Target, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/
target (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
135
Willis Wee, 10 Brands Claimed by Twitter Cybersquatters, PENNOLSON (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.penn-olson.com/2009/09/21/10-brandsclaimed-by-twitter-cybersquatters/ (discussing various brand names that
succumbed to name squatting). One of these fake profiles had over 1,000
followers during 2009, but many of these usernames have either been suspended
or transferred to the rightful owners. Id. The lack of activity (many have no
tweets) on these pages serves as evidence that these profiles are held by
impostors.
136
See id.
137
Id.
138
See Volkswagen, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/volkswagen (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010). Previously, the owner of the profile solicited bids for
individuals to purchase the username “@volkswagen.” See Wee, supra note
135. However, the profile now contains the company’s logos, directs customers
to the official Volkswagen website, has over 600 tweets, and has close to 9,000
followers. See Volkswagen, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/volkswagen (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010). Thus, the profile has clearly been transferred to
Volkswagen.
139
Stephen Calogera, Hyundai Falls Victim to Cybersquatters on Twitter,
EGMCARTECH (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.egmcartech.com/2009/11/10/
hyundai-falls-victim-to-cyber-squatters-on-twitter/.
140
Id.
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company.141 However, the problem still exists, as impostors
currently reserved famous brand names including Apple,142
Macbook,143 Carvel,144 Nike,145 Adidas,146 Ikea,147 Neiman
Marcus,148 and DSquared.149 Thus, cybersquatters have abused and
continue to abuse the username feature on Twitter.
In light of the wave of these fake profiles, Twitter amended its
policy. Much like the username infringement form on Facebook,
companies can complain to the site’s administrators about a case of
username infringement.150 Twitter requires that in order for there to
be name squatting, the account must be active and that there have
been “attempts to sell, buy, or solicit other forms of payment in
exchange for usernames.”151 Conversely, accounts without status
updates that contain no profile image typically indicates “that
there’s no name-squatting or impersonation.”152
For non-cybersquatting cases, Twitter has a catch-all trademark
policy. 153 Trademark owners can report any infringing use of their
141

See Hyundai, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/hyundai (last visited Sept. 15,
2010). Hyundai now owns this username and profile. See Calogera, supra note
139.
142
See Apple, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/Apple (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
143
See Macbook, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/macbook (last visited Sept.
15, 2010).
144
See Carvel, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/carvel (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
145
See Nike, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/nike (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
See also NIk!, MYSPACE, http://myspace.com/nike (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
146
See Adidas, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/adidas (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
147
See Ikea, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ikea (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
148
See Neiman Marcus, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/neimanmarcus (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010).
149
See Dsqaured, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/dsquared (last visited Sept.
15, 2010).
150
See Name Squatting Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.
twitter.com/articles/18370-name-squatting-policy (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See Trademark Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.
com/entries/18367 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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marks to Twitter’s administrators.154 Because Twitter does not
want to inhibit free speech and expression on news feeds and
hashtags, the administrators do “not actively monitor users’
content and will not edit or remove user content.” 155 Rather, the
trademark owners are expected to police their marks and report
any infringing use. 156 When reporting infringing use of a mark on
devices such as hashtags, the trademark owner must provide proof
of registration.157 Unregistered marks are not protected under this
mechanism.158
Currently, it appears that Twitter vigorously enforces this
policy.
For example, in December 2009, after receiving
complaints about an infringing username on the Heinz trademark,
Twitter changed the username without consulting the profile
owner.159 Likewise, Twitter transferred the Hyundai username to
the rightful owners after the company complained.160 Even with
such enforcement, however, the policy is reactive rather than
proactive. Companies must wait until the infringement has
occurred before they may file a complaint.161 In that period of
time, the damage may already have occurred, as it had with the BP
and Clean Flicks profiles.162 Therefore, although companies have
options to protect their brand names, Twitter’s current policy does
little to protect them from trademark infringement and potential
harm to their brand names.

154

Id.
See id.
156
See id.
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
Jason Turbow, The Great Ketchup Experiment: Cybersquatting and the
Power of Social Media, BAYNEWSER (Feb. 17, 2010, 12:57 PM), http://www.
mediabistro.com/baynewser/twitter/the_great_ketchup_experiment_cybersquatti
ng_and_the_power_of_social_media_152333.asp (discussing how Twitter
transferred the username “HJ Heinz” to “NotHJ_Heinz”).
160
See Hyundai, TWITTER HELP CENTER, supra note 141; see also
Calogera, supra note 139.
161
See Name Squatting Policy, TWITTER, supra note 150.
162
See supra text accompanying notes 27–29, 105–109.
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C. ACPA and Username Infringement
The ACPA, enacted over ten years ago, addressed the abusive
registration of full quality domain names.163 Legislators, however,
did not foresee the launch and exponential growth of the Internet
during the “Web 2.0” phenomenon; such lack of foresight is
evident with the limitation of the ACPA to top level domain
names.164 In light of this new venue, the ACPA, while somewhat
dated, nevertheless gives trademark owners a remedy to such
abusive registrations.165
1. The Likelihood of Confusion
With the growth of popularity in social networking websites,
one must wonder whether, in this context, username infringement
is likely to cause any confusion among consumers. As a marketing
channel, the Internet “is particularly susceptible to a likelihood of
confusion since . . . it allows for competing marks to be
encountered at the same time, on the same screen.”166 The search
costs of stumbling on an impostor’s profile, however, are rather
minimal; the Internet user merely has to click the back button to
leave the page.167
Under the ACPA, courts do not address “whether the accused
domain name is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s domain name,
but whether it is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark or

163

MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
See O’Reilly, supra note 2 (describing the rise of personal homepages
during the Web 2.0 phenomenon). Such websites would not include top level
domain names. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1127 (West 2006) (“The term ‘domain name’ means any alphanumeric
designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an
electronic address on the Internet.”).
165
In light of Web 2.0 and increased user control, see O’Reilly, supra note
2 (discussing increased user control in the Web 2.0 phenomenon), this Note
argues for an expansion of the definition of “domain name.” See infra Part IV.A.
166
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir.
2000).
167
See id. at 1209.
164
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service mark.”168 Thus, a vanity URL that is confusingly similar to
a plaintiff’s trademark would satisfy the first requirement of the
ACPA.169 Because vanity URLs function as domain names,170 an
infringement claim for name squatting would mirror the likelihood
of confusion analysis with domain names.171
2. Bad Faith Intent on Social Media Websites
Congress created the ACPA to prevent abusive registrations of
domain names.172 On the one hand, some evidence that judges use
to ascertain whether a defendant abusively registered a domain
name in bad faith will be applicable to this analysis in the
username context.173 On the other hand, the reservation of one’s
nickname as a username presents judges with a unique problem in
evaluating the bad faith element.174
Nicknames could present courts with a problem in determining
whether an individual reserved a username in bad faith. Myspace,
Twitter, and Facebook allow their users to reserve usernames,
which serve as URL shortcuts to a profile.175 Such usernames can
conflict with famous marks, particularly if the mark and nickname
are similar. For example, an individual on Myspace reserved the
username “Nike” because his nickname is “Nik. E.”176 The
168

MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
See id. For a full discussion of the “presumption of confusion” standard,
see infra Part I.B.1.
170
GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1207; see also Wakiyama and Kagan,
supra note 18 (discussing how Facebook usernames function as URLs).
171
See Texas Int’l. Prop. Assoc. v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, 624 F. Supp. 2d
582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 2009); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919–20 (E.D. Va. 2000).
172
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
See supra text accompanying notes 18–20.
176
Many users on Myspace have registered usernames that are substantially
similar to famous brands. See, e.g., Nik!, MYSPACE, supra note 145. On this
profile, the user seems to have reserved a nickname. Id. On others, the user
seems to have reserved the famous brand name as an online nickname, but is not
one that he is commonly referred to. See, e.g., Doddio, MYSPACE,
http://www.myspace.com/stopnshop (last updated Feb. 11, 2010, 2:58 AM).
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reservation of this username was performed in good faith, but it
prevents Nike from using its trademark on Myspace.177
The legal name safe harbor of the ACPA merely provides a
court with “the appropriate discretion to determine whether or not
the fact that a person bears a nickname similar to a mark at issue is
an indication of an absence of bad-faith on the part of the
registrant.”178 The crafters of the ACPA of course did not intend
for this provision to permit users to make up a nickname that is
substantially similar to a well-known brand name.179 However,
individuals could attempt to reserve a domain name with a “word
that they claim as a ‘nickname’ which is allegedly ‘commonly
used’ to refer to them, but which is very similar to that of a wellknown trademark.”180
A legal name would fall under the safe harbor provision of the
ACPA because the applicant could have registered the username in
good faith.181 A person, however, could also assert that they use a
commonly used word as a nickname, which also happens to be
similar to a trademark.182 Such username reservations would
present judges with a situation in which it would not be clear
whether the username was reserved in bad faith.183 Some users will
obviously do this in bad faith and assert that their use of the
nickname falls under the safe harbor provision.184 Fortunately, one
may not assert a good faith claim under the safe harbor provision
after the dispute over the username arises.185 The line between
177

See Nik!, MySpace, supra note 145.
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at
10 (1999)).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
See, e.g., Int’l Bancorp v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
Estrangers a Monaco, 192 F.Supp. 2d 467,485 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“A putative
cyberpirate can satisfy this factor only if its name or commonly-used nickname
is the same as the domain name in dispute.”). A legal name is generally a
person’s name. See id.
182
Id.
183
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.
184
See id. (“For example, consider the hypothetical Roberto Wayne who
registers the domain name sonywalkman.net and who claims that this is justified
because his friends call him “sony” and that he is a man who walks a lot.”).
185
See id. A good faith claim “cannot be founded upon some purported
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such claims, however, would be rather blurry. Courts will be
forced to choose between a person’s right to use his nickname in a
social setting against the proprietary interests of the trademark
owner.186 Ascertaining whether someone used that nickname in
good faith would entail an examination as to how extensively the
impostor used the nickname in the past and whether he created the
nickname to be identified with a particular source.187 Such an
examination, however, would be difficult and expensive.188
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENFORCING TRADEMARK RIGHTS ON
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES
Although there are loopholes that allow users to reserve a
username that infringes on a famous brand name, trademark
owners still have options to protect their rights.189 There are two
problems with allowing individuals to sue for trademark
infringement in social media websites. First, trademark owners
might become too strategic in their enforcement of their trademark
rights by suing the social media websites for infringement.
Second, trademark owners will overly enforce their trademark
rights to the point that it will stifle speech in a socially valuable
setting.
Given the redressability of trademark rights, the
enforcement of these rights must be limited in order to avoid
frivolous lawsuits and impermissible infringement on free speech.
A. Contributory Infringement by Social Networking Sites
In La Russa’s complaint, he accused Twitter of cybersquatting
via contributory infringement.190 La Russa would likely have lost
his case, as registration sites, such as Twitter, are generally not
good faith use of the domain name undertaken only after the dispute arose and
motivated by a desire to fabricate a good faith defense.” Id.
186
See id. See infra Part III.B, for a fuller discussion of this tension.
187
See Int’l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp 2d at 485.
188
Id.
189
See id.
190
See Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 2 (arguing that since Twitter
maintained the domain name, it was contributorily liable for third party
infringement).
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liable for violations of the ACPA.191 Judges do not recognize
contributory liability for registration sites because the operator of
the registration site has no role in creating the website’s content.192
The ACPA strictly limits liability for “the domain name registrant
or that registrant’s authorized licensee” when registering infringing
domain names.193 Registration sites, therefore, are not the
appropriate defendants for such lawsuits.
In the social networking setting, La Russa’s claim against
Twitter should be precluded by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),194 a statute that deals
primarily with defamatory or otherwise illegal content.195 The
CDA states that no “provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”196
A social networking site, which is a provider of interactive
computer service, would thus be immune under this statute.197
Some courts have refused to grant this immunity for Interactive
Service Providers (“ISPs”) where the administrator “edits in a
manner that contributes to the alleged illegality.”198 However,
when an interactive service provider uses neutral tools that
incidentally assist the alleged illegality, the ISP will generally be
immune from liability.199 Invoking this analysis, a social
191

American Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (E.D.
Wis. 2005) (“[R]egistrars are not obliged to examine domain names to ensure
that the registrant is not violating the rights of a third party.”).
192
Parker v. Google, 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 503 (E.D. Pa. 2006); but see
Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(holding that Google could be held liable for third party infringement because
they allegedly paid registrants for registering infringing domain names).
193
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(D) (West 2006).
194
See MacMillan, supra note 24.
195
Id.
196
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (West 1998).
197
See MacMillan, supra note 24 (noting that Google, MySpace, AOL, and
Craigslist are immune under CDA).
198
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008).
199
E.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2008).
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networking website would generally be liable if the administrators
edited the content of the username or profile in a way which
created infringement.200 Neutral mechanisms, like the registration
of a username, would not be sufficient under this analysis.201
La Russa cleverly avoided this immunity provision by asserting
a cybersquatting claim.202 Under Section 230(e) of the CDA, the
immunity provision is not intended to “limit or expand”
intellectual property law.203 A trademark infringement claim such
as La Russa’s would circumvent this immunity provision because
the claim would be predicated on trademark infringement, and
Section 230(e) provides that the immunity provision should not be
construed to limit trademark law. On the one hand, by granting
outright immunity to any ISP, trademark owners would have no
relief against websites that are complicit with infringing
activities.204 From a policy perspective, however, granting a
trademark cause of action against a social networking website is
troubling, for it seems to undermine the spirit of CDA.205 By
asserting a cybersquatting or metatag infringement claim, a
plaintiff would be able to preclude immunity and sue social
networking sites for third party infringement.206
Despite these problems, judges do not tend to recognize such
claims against neutral third party websites.207 The ACPA does not
mention secondary liability and thus this theory is primarily
derived from the common law.208 Similar to the analysis under the
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Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1169.
Id.
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See Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that since Twitter
maintained the domain name, it was contributorily liable for third party
infringement).
203
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2) (West 1998).
204
See MacMillan, supra note 24.
205
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c).
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Id.
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See Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 456 U.S.
844, 855 (1982) (establishing the rule for contributory infringement for
products); Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 983 (discussing the rule for
contributory infringement for services).
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CDA, domain registration sites209 generally cannot be held liable
for contributory infringement because the registration of websites
typically does not entail intentional inducement to create infringing
products on a mark.210 The court in Lockheed Martin v. Network
Solutions held that third parties offering services must have direct
control and monitoring over the instrumentality in order to be held
liable.211 Likewise, in Tiffany v. eBay, a case involving counterfeit
goods, the Second Circuit held that in order for there to be
contributory infringement, “a service provider must have more
than a general knowledge or a reason to know that its service is
being used to sell counterfeit goods.”212 Rather, the court reasoned
that the “contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are
infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”213
Under the Tiffany standard, social networking sites would not
be liable for cybersquatting if the administrators did not have
specific and contemporary knowledge of the trademark
infringement.214 Without specific knowledge, there would not be
direct control over the instrumentalities, the requirement
articulated by the court in Lockheed-Martin.215 Even with specific
knowledge, if the website takes reasonable steps to curtail the
infringement, as eBay did, then the website cannot be held
contributorily liable for cybersquatting.216 Without specific
knowledge or inaction, there would be no intentional inducement
and thus no contributory infringement.217 Consequently, unless a
social networking site monitors and controls the reservation of an
infringing username, and makes no effort to ameliorate the
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See, e.g., REGISTER.COM, http://www.register.com/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2010). A domain registration site allows an individual to reserve a domain name
or renew an expired domain name, and even offers services such as search
engine optimization. See id.
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See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 983.
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Id. at 985.
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Tiffany (N.J.), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Id.
214
See id.
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See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 985 (9th Cir. 1999)
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Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107–10.
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problem, the site should not be held liable.218
B. Effects on Free Speech Rights on the Internet
The enforcement of trademark rights regulates use of a mark to
prevent dilution or genericide of the mark.219 The First
Amendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, affords
individuals the right to free speech, which gives individuals the
right to express themselves for political and social reasons, among
others.220 In contrast, trademark law is about preventing the use of
a word, slogan, or design by someone other than the mark
owner.221 In the context of social media websites, the regulation of
both username vanity URLs and hashtags would prevent people
from using a particular mark in a social setting, where the First
Amendment generally protects expression.222 The protection of a
trademark and the right to free speech are therefore at odds with
one another. The monopolization of a popular term, particularly
one with cultural significance, could stifle artistic expression,
criticism, and other social speech.223
The general rule for free speech in trademark law is that if the
use of the mark in speech is noncommercial or nominative it will
not pose a threat to the trademark owner’s interests.224 The courts
currently define “commercial speech” as speech that “does no
more than propose a commercial transaction” in a manner
“removed from any exposition of ideas.”225 Noncommercial speech
218

See id.
William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1225 (2008) [hereinafter
McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals].
220
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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See McGeveran, supra note 219.
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See supra Part II.A.
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See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 65–66 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair
Use].
224
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
308 (9th Cir. 1992).
225
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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encompasses speech that is not economically motivated, and is
instead used describe the mark or to criticize it.226 This could entail
social criticism, as in Mattel v. RCA Records.227 In Mattel, the
Ninth Circuit held that Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl,” a 1990s one hit
wonder, was protected speech because it was a parody on Barbie, a
cultural figure.228 Similarly, nominative speech is protected
because even if used in a commercial setting, the mark is merely
used to designate the actual owner and is thereby deemed to be fair
use.229
Use of a mark, even if used for criticism, can be problematic
for trademark owners. Before the growth of the Internet, criticism
was limited to small circles and did not spread rapidly throughout
society.230 Cyberspace is a potentially problematic venue for
trademark owners because criticism can be widely disseminated
and trademark owners can thereby lose control over the reputation
of their marks.231 Social networking sites are even more
problematic because they are heavily used and word of mouth
spreads quickly on those websites.232 In addition, by permitting
everyone to use a trademark on the Internet, the mark could lose its
function as a source identifier and thereby become a generic

226

See Smith v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that defendant’s use of the terms “Wal-Qaeda” and
“Walocaust” constituted noncommercial speech because the defendant used the
term expressively, and his economic motives were secondary at most). By
definition cybersquatting is per se commercial speech. See MCCARTHY, supra
note 12, §25:78. However, mere reservation of a website cannot constitute per
se commercial speech. See id.
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Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2001)
(discussing how Aqua’s song, “Barbie Girl” criticized the source).
228
Id.
229
See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308–09. Such speech would
include a comparison made in an advertisement to differentiate or situate one’s
brand in the market. Id.
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See McGeveran, Disclosure, supra note 98, at 1122–27.
231
See id. Indeed, this was the case with the fake BP account on Twitter.
See Stelter, supra note 27.
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See generally Stelter, supra note 26 (discussing how within the span of
months, 145,000 followers began to follow the fake BP profile, which produced
damaging tweets).
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term.233 Therefore, it is understandable why trademark owners
would want to control discussion and use of the mark on social
media websites.
The problem that arises from the enforcement of trademark
rights is that the high cost of litigation will discourage users from
expressing themselves in a social setting.234 In Smith v. Walmart
Stores, Inc., a clear case of fair use, Walmart flooded the court
with expert evidence and prolonged the trial for two years.235
Indeed after receiving an ample amount of evidence, the court
engaged in a lengthy likelihood of confusion analysis.236 A
likelihood of confusion analysis requires significant evidence,
specifically the use of expensive experts,237 and the length of a
likelihood of confusion trial could result in expensive legal fees.238
In the social media context, large and expensive law firms are
already encouraging trademark owners to preemptively enforce
their proprietary interests with regards to username
infringement.239 The threat of litigation could stifle expression
through creative usernames.240 If courts grant trademark owners a
monopoly over a mark, it could inhibit expression because users
simply would not want to risk being sued for trademark
infringement.241
A remedy for this problem, advocated by Professor Bill
McGeveran, would be to weed out the obvious free speech
233

See McGeveran, Disclosure, supra note 98, at 1144–1145.
See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 223, at 52.
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(N.D. Ga. 2008)
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See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 223, at 99.
239
See, e.g., Lynn Humphreys, Protecting Your Trademark From
Facebook Username Abuse, MORRISON & FOERSTER (June 11, 2009),
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/15669.html.
240
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(8th Cir. 1994). In Balducci, the plaintiff’s parody (“Michelob Oily”) was not
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cases.242 If a username is used for criticism of the source,
nominative use, or non-commercial fair use, then courts should
dismiss the case.243 Rather than raising this affirmative defense
after going through the prima facie elements for confusion,
defendants should be able to raise this argument before going
through the test.244 Litigation is costly and burdensome for
defendants, and by shortening litigation, users would still be able
to use words to express themselves without seriously infringing a
mark.
IV. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CYBERSQUATTING ON SOCIAL
MEDIA WEBSITES
The advent of username features on social networks could be
much more than a nuisance to trademark owners if it poses a grave
threat to their proprietary interests. If trademark owners do not
enforce their rights in this realm, they will face the risk of
genericide or dilution of their brand name.245 Users could post
vulgar updates that would taint the reputation of the mark. There is
also the potential of consumer confusion.246 If social media
websites tolerate such genericide or dilution, it would result in a
diminished potency of the brand name’s power in electronic
commerce.247 Therefore, the loopholes in both the ACPA and in
these websites’ policies need to be addressed to provide trademark
owners with adequate protection.248
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A. Remedies for Common Law Doctrine and the ACPA

Since Congress did not foresee increased user control on the
Internet, the ACPA is outdated and could potentially be deemed to
be inapplicable in this venue. Therefore, Congress needs to clarify
and amend certain provisions within the statute.
First, metatag infringement should be separated from the
Lanham Act. Trademark infringement on social media sites is not
limited to username infringement. The ACPA would not reach
these “hashtags” because social media sites do not control or
assign the use of such search items.249 On the one hand, the
infringing use of a metatag is not quite as harmful as it was in the
days of Brookfield, as Internet users are not the luddites that courts
assumed they were in the 1990s.250 Even so, the damage could be
fairly far reaching, possibly even leading to genericide of the
mark.251 Such tags would draw consumers to impostor profiles,
confuse consumers, and weaken the brand’s power.252 The reason
for creating a separate cause of action is that metatags are not a
good fit for either the ACPA or the Lanham Act. While these
search terms do not have the preclusive effect of cybersquatting,
they traffic Internet users to another site and in doing so, harm the
trademark owner.253
Courts examine these search items under the standard eight
factor likelihood of confusion analysis,254 rather than employ the

249

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (defining domain name as one which is
assigned by a registrar); What are Hashtags (# Symbols)?, TWITTER HELP
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condensed analysis articulated in GoTo.com v. Walt Disney.255
Indeed, a judge would be hard-pressed to find that many of the
eight factors are applicable on the Internet.256 Courts should depart
from the eight factor analysis for metatag infringement because it
is too difficult of a standard to pass,257 and instead should follow
the two factor analysis under GoTo.com.258
Second, Congress needs to clarify the ACPA’s bad faith
provision. The ACPA creates a safe harbor for a registrant who
registers a name “that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person.”259 Registration of such a name, which could include
nicknames, would help to establish that the user did not register a
domain name in bad faith.260 In the social media setting,
scrutinizing whether the username was reserved in bad faith would
be problematic because essentially all of the infringers would
claim that the username is their nickname.261 In some cases,
ascertaining whether the nickname was registered in bad faith
would be easy, as the reservation of the username in such cases
would satisfy many of the non-exclusive factors set forth in the
ACPA.262 In other cases, the user might register a username in
good faith not knowing of the similarity between his nickname and
the trademark.263 Congress could clarify the provision by providing
evidentiary standards to quickly and easily ascertain if the user
reserved the username in good faith.
Finally, Congress should harmonize the ACPA with Section
230 of the CDA. The problem with Internet cases is that virtually
255
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257
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1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II) (West 2006).
260
See infra Part II.C.2.
261
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every trademark owner and celebrity could—and likely would—
assert a cybersquatting cause of action, thus avoiding the CDA’s
immunity provision.264 Allowing such claims could flood the
courts with baseless secondary liability claims and could become
burdensome for social media sites as well. Congress should
weaken the express exemption for intellectual property claims
under Section 230(e) of the CDA because that section completely
eliminates immunity for any intellectual property cause of
action.265 While this discourages ISPs from ignoring trademark
infringement, it also subjects ISPs to frivolous lawsuits. The
alarming trend with Section 230(e) is that plaintiffs state a cause of
action under the ACPA in order to avoid the immunity provision of
CDA 230(c).266 Such an exemption allows plaintiffs like La Russa
to state a cybersquatting claim when the claim is really predicated
on defamatory status updates and profile content.267 By weakening
this exemption, Congress could save the courts and social media
websites from having to fend off frivolous lawsuits.
B. Remedies for Social Media Policy
The ACPA should not be the only remedy for this form of
cybersquatting. Amending these websites’ policies would provide
a less costly alternative to trademark owners.268 Administrators of
social media websites should also play an active role in curtailing
such infringement. By broadening the scope of the verification
mechanisms available to corporations and by enforcing the
verification policy more stringently, trademark owners would be
able to pursue a viable alternative to the costly litigation associated
264

See Macmillan, supra note 24 (noting the distinction between trademark
infringement and protections afforded ISPs under Section 230 in cases dealing
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265
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2) (West 2006).
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which file sharing networks could be held liable for copyright infringement).
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268
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with the ACPA.269 Moreover, these administrators would serve as
gatekeepers and weed out unnecessary and frivolous litigation.
1. Verification Features
Verification features are useful tools to proactively combat
username infringement. Both Twitter and Facebook have such
features, but both need to be amended in order to provide
trademark owners with adequate protection. Strengthening these
features will allow Twitter’s and Facebook’s trademark policies to
be proactive rather than retroactive. Twitter has become a haven
for cybersquatters and therefore needs to amend its current
verification policy. Twitter should extend its verification feature to
include all corporations. Currently, the policy only applies to some
large conglomerates, such as Target.270 Twitter is currently testing
a verification policy for businesses, but the website is not
accepting verification requests from all businesses yet.271 Under
the current Twitter verification policy, users are free to pose as
corporations and free ride off the good will of that corporation.272
Evidence of reservation of famous brands as usernames suggests
that this is exactly what is happening on Twitter.273 Permitting
such free riding could lead to genericide of the mark, tarnishment
of the owner’s reputation, and consumer confusion. Expansion of
the verification tool to all corporations would help to curtail
cybersquatting on Twitter because the verification badge allows
users to discern the official profile for each corporation and its
brand names.274 The verification tool would also cut consumer
search costs because a user would able to spot a fake profile, even
if they were misled by a deceptive hashtag.275 In doing so, this
would also protect the consumer from fraud.
Facebook’s policy may also need to be amended. Although
269
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Facebook does have a verification feature, it appears to be a weak
one. Currently, Facebook requires that an official representative
reserve the username and the administrators verify such accounts
via mobile authentication.276 Impostors could pose as official
representatives and pose as the representative during “mobile
authentication.”277 As a solution, the representative should be
required to produce proof of ownership of the mark; a registration
certificate, for example, would be sufficient proof here. The
website should also require verification through a company email
address. A more stringent implementation of the verification policy
would help circumvent the problem and discourage impostors from
trying to verify their profiles fraudulently.
In addition, Facebook’s verification policy does little to avoid
consumer confusion. Specifically, the verification278 feature does
not feature a visual “badge” like Twitter’s verification feature.279
By creating a badge for verified accounts, users would easily be
able to discern fake profiles from real ones. Creating these badges
would therefore reduce search costs and reduce the potential harms
of username infringement.
2. Reporting Procedures: A Method to Avoid Costly Litigation
Trademark owners would be wise to work with the
administrators of social media sites to shut down impostor profiles.
Both Facebook and Twitter encourage trademark owners to report
instances of name squatting.280 Both websites require the
trademark owner to provide proof of ownership via a registration
number.281 Since protection is predicated on registration of the
276
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mark, the brand owner would be wise to register his mark or risk
losing the benefits of the reporting mechanisms.282 Significantly,
this process is relatively inexpensive in comparison to litigating
against the mark owner.283 The mark owner would also get what he
wants—the username would be transferred and the impostor
profile will be shut down.284
Moreover, the administrators would be able to weed out
frivolous complaints, particularly where there is a free speech
interest at stake. For example, if a username is “Nikesucks” or any
other form of clear criticism, the administrators should dismiss any
related complaints because this is clearly a form of criticism with
the source as the target.285 Employing this strategy will create an
alternative to costly litigation by working constructively with the
administrators of social media websites.
In some cases, specifically with unregistered marks, litigation
might be inevitable.286 Site administrators might refuse to transfer
or eliminate the infringing profile; in such a case, the plaintiff
would be forced to appeal. In this event, litigation would be
necessary to protect the mark owners’ interests.287 Consequently,
the plaintiff should only litigate when the social media site
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wrongly rejects his complaint and such litigation should be a last
resort because it is expensive and time consuming. In sum,
plaintiffs, and even defendants, should use litigation when there
are no other alternatives available.
CONCLUSION
Cybersquatting on social media websites poses to trademark
owners a real threat that must be addressed. Trademark owners
should not immediately pursue a cause of action under the ACPA.
Instead, trademark owners should work with these websites to
protect their own interests. Trademark owners have a number of
options at their disposal—they could: (1) ask the website to
transfer the username, (2) ask the website to shut down the profile
or hashtag, (3) contact the profile owner and ask him to transfer the
username, or (4) verify the account.288 To create a viable option for
creating an official page, web administrators need to create a
strong verification policy to proactively combat name squatting.
Doing so will prevent serious damage to a trademark.
These policy problems are not confined to social media
websites. The ACPA is an outdated statute, one which needs to be
amended to adequately address the modern and complex issues
associated with cybersquatting on social media websites. Congress
should amend the bad faith provision, particularly its safe harbor
provision. In addition, Congress needs to weaken the CDA’s
exemption of intellectual property claims from its immunity
provision to prevent frivolous litigation. It is crucial that such
changes are made in order to prevent cybersquatters from getting a
free ride from a mark and to protect the brand of mark owners on
social media websites.
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